Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind by John R
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind [John R
Replete as they are with complex, abstract and controversial ideas,these two short paragraphs have set the agenda for all subsequentphilosophical discussions of intentionality in the late nineteenth andthe twentieth century. There has been some discussion over the meaningof Brentano's expression ‘intentional inexistence.’ DidBrentano mean that the objects onto which the mind is directed areinternal to the mind itself (in-exist in the mind)?Or did he mean that the mind can be directed ontonon-existent objects? Or did he mean both? (See Crane, 1998for further discussion.)
Intentionality An Essay In The Philosophy Of Mind 1983
Now the following questions arise: are Brentano and thephenomenological tradition right? Do all mental states exhibitintentionality? Is intentionality a feature of every aspect of humanexperience? Are all forms of consciousness consciousness ofsomething? Does every mental state possess one or the other directionof fit? Do sensations (e.g., pains), feelings, emotions (e.g.,depression) all exhibit intentionality? These questions are verycontroversial in contemporary philosophy of mind. Before examiningvarious contradictory answers to these questions, a preliminaryquestion is relevant. Whether Brentano was right or not, why should wewant a mark or a criterion of the mental at all?